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Introduction 
The protection of civilians (PoC) has received increasing levels of at-
tention in United Nations (UN) mandated peacekeeping operations 
over the course of the past decade. Since 1999, eleven UN peacekeep-
ing operations have been provided with increasingly robust protection 
of civilians mandates, and the UN System has over the past years fo-
cussed increasing levels of attention on the protection of civilians, not 
only in peacekeeping operations, but indeed across the range of activi-
ties undertaken by the UN in support of conflict management, resolu-
tion and transformation efforts. Although the wording of the clauses 
that address the protection of civilians in UN Security Council resolu-
tions has been quite similar to date, the ways in which different mis-
sions have implemented these mandates have varied. Because mis-
sions operate within differing contexts, each mission is required to 
develop a unique strategy through which to achieve the common prin-
ciples and aims of protecting civilians in conflict situations according 
to the unique setting in which it operates. 
 
This paper compares the protection of civilians strategies of three dif-
ferent UN peacekeeping operations: the United Nations Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, since 2010 the United 
Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC – MONUSCO); the hybrid 
African Union - United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID); and 
the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) that was drawn down 
in early 2010 and replaced by a new UN mission in Southern Sudan).2 
This comparison of strategies is intended to inform efforts to bring 
more coherence to the protection of civilians work in UN peacekeep-
ing operations.3 The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN 
DPKO) and the UN Department of Field Services (UN DFS), together 
with the Global Protection Cluster in New York, continues to develop 
guidelines for the drafting of mission-wide PoC strategies, as well as 
developing further guidance for peacekeeping operations, and this pa-
per aims to contribute to the process. 
Comparison of Protection Strategies 
It is to be expected that mission-specific protection of civilians (PoC) 
strategies will differ in approach and form, given the distinct chal-
lenges faced by each mission. However, this paper commences from 
the premise that there may also be shared experiences, challenges and 
best practises, that can inform future refinements in mission PoC 
strategies, the development of similar strategies in other missions, as 
                                                 
2  The UNMIS strategy was updated in October 2010 to prepare for the specific challenges 
facing the mission in the final months of the transition period. Our comparison includes 
this version of the strategy. 
3  For an analysis of practical approaches to the protection of civilians in MONUC, see Stian 
Kjeksrud and Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Protection of civilians in practice – emerging les-
sons from the UN mission in the DR Congo, FFI Rapport, Kjeller: Norwegian Defense 
Research Establishment 2010. 
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well as the development of strategic level guidance. This comparison 
is intended to inform such an analysis. In order to meaningfully com-
pare the three mission-wide strategies of MONUC, UNAMID and 
UNMIS, this paper has opted to use the following five levels of con-
sideration: (1) conceptualization, (2) operationalization, (3) prioritiza-
tion, (4) capabilities and constraints, and (5) integration and coordina-
tion. 
Conceptualization of Protection 
The UN System-wide Strategy for the Protection of Civilians in the 
DRC places the role of the UN in the DRC  in the context of the new 
emerging norm of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, and notes that the 
World Summit (2005) outcome document placed a responsibility on 
the UN to support Member States in protecting their populations. The 
Strategy refers back to the definition of ‘protection’ that was formu-
lated in MONUC’s Protection of Civilians Strategy of March 2009, 
namely ‘all activities aimed at ensuring the safety and physical integri-
ty of civilian populations, particularly children, women, and other 
vulnerable groups, including IDPs; preventing the perpetration of war 
crimes and other deliberated acts of violence against civilians; secur-
ing humanitarian access; and ensuring full respect for the rights of the 
individual, in accordance with relevant national and international bod-
ies of law, i.e. human rights law and international humanitarian law’. 
The Strategy provides for a notion of protection that covers a wide 
range of relationships and stages. It first notes that the UN mission 
and agencies should integrate protection into their work so as to en-
sure that their activities do not lead to, or perpetuate, protection risks 
for the communities they serve. The strategy then builds on UN Secur-
ity Council Resolution 1856, which mandates the mission with both 
immediate protection responsibilities, as well as the responsibility to 
work with national authorities to develop an environment conducive 
to the protections of civilians. 
 
The UNAMID Mission Directive of January 2009 on the Protection of 
Civilians in Darfur defines protection as ‘all activities aimed at obtain-
ing full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the 
letter and spirit of the relevant bodies’, as specified in Human Rights 
law, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), refugee law, etc. While 
this definition corresponds with that of the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee,4 and resounds well with the notion of protection within 
the humanitarian community, it is perhaps too wide for peacekeepers 
to operationalize and implement in practise. This broad definition is 
then however limited by the Directive, and the 2010 Darfur Protection 
Strategy, to physical protection and the protection of humanitarian 
                                                 
4  IASC, Growing the Sheltering Tree - Protecting Rights through Humanitarian Action, 
Geneva: UNICEF 2002. 
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space. Whilst the UNAMID Directive and Strategy recognize that pro-
tection requires the cooperation of a wide range of actors, starting with 
the local authorities and communities, and including the whole range 
of humanitarian and other actors, the Directive is focused on the role 
of the respective components of UNAMID, and especially those with 
direct responsibility for protection, i.e. the military, police, the Hu-
manitarian, Recovery and Development Unit (HRDU) and the Child 
Protection unit. 
 
The UNMIS Protection of Civilians Strategy and the separate Security 
Concept make extensive reference to UN Security Council statements 
on protection, and the specific protection responsibilities that UNMIS 
has been tasked with by the UNSC. The Strategy’s overall goal is to 
reduce and prevent systematic patterns of violence, and it aims to do 
so through a combination of preventive, remedial and environment-
building actions. The strategy identifies three core objectives, namely: 
security-focused protection of civilians under imminent threat; secur-
ing access to humanitarian and relief activities; and longer-term con-
flict prevention and management and the implementation of human 
rights. The UNMIS strategy conceptualizes ‘civilians’ as non-
combatants, but makes special provision for vulnerable groups that 
require specific protection measures; namely children, women, the 
disabled, the elderly, the displaced, refugees and returnees. 
 
The most recent UNMIS PoC strategy (October 2010) must be seen in 
relation to the particular security concerns arising as the interim period 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) came to an end in July 
2011. As such, the strategy has a clear expiry date. A new strategy 
will be drafted when the new peacekeeping operation in Southern Su-
dan is mandated. In the new strategy, the Security Concept from 2009 
is still the reference document with regard to guidance and details on 
all aspects of the ‘use of force’. One of the provisions of the strategy, 
however, is to update this document to identify the precise roles and 
responsibilities of the Mission sections, pillars and Senior Mission 
Leadership in supporting ‘protection through political prevention’. 
The strategy states that the UNMIS’ mandate articulates three core 
responsibilities: to protect civilians under threat of physical violence, 
to facilitate coordination within its capabilities of the voluntary return 
of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and to facilitate 
the provision of humanitarian assistance; and to assist the CPA parties 
in promoting the rule of law and the protection of human rights for all 
people of Sudan. The overall goal of the strategy is to: prevent, reduce 
and when necessary stop violence against civilian populations in the 
Mission area, within mandate and capabilities; ensure humanitarian 
access to vulnerable populations; and assist the Government of Sudan 
(GoS) and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) to assume their 
primary responsibility to protect civilian populations. 
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Apart from conceptual nuances at the meta-level, all three mission 
strategies have conceptualised protection around three dimensions, 
namely (1) security-focused, or direct, protection, (2) securing human-
itarian access, and (3) building an environment conducive to longer-
term protection. All three mission strategies recognize that protection 
can only be achieved through cooperation with local and national au-
thorities, as well as through concerted action across the political, secu-
rity, rule of law, humanitarian, development and social reconciliation 
dimensions. 
Operationalization 
The UN System-wide Strategy for the Protection of Civilians in the 
DRC has a clear set of measurable results as well as a detailed set of 
critical tasks, each with associated actions, namely: the (1) harmoniza-
tion of data gathering and analysis at a system-wide level, (2) anticipa-
tion, mitigation and prevention of protection risks, (3) contribution to 
remedial actions, and (4) provision of support to the establishment of a 
protective environment. 
 
In order to enhance protection, the UNAMID Directive and Strategy 
focuses on three core activities: preventive protection (humanitarian 
space), immediate response protection (responses to grave violations 
against civilians) and follow-up protection (reporting incidents, not 
investigation). Due to the mission’s context, the Directive and Stra-
tegy do not include long-term protection activities, and the immediate 
response protection pillar receives most attention. The Directive in-
cludes a detailed list of potential scenarios that may threaten the well-
being of civilians, as well as the appropriate responses and responsi-
bilities of the various UNAMID components and units. This very con-
crete description of possible scenarios and responses provide clear 
guidance to all mission components on how they should act when 
faced with various scenarios. However, the Strategy is not as clear in 
identifying measurable results that can be benchmarked to monitor 
impact. 
 
The UNMIS Protection of Civilians Strategy provides for three levels 
of implementation. The strategic level engages the Government of Na-
tional Unity and the Government of South Sudan at the state-level (in 
Sudan the 2
nd
 tier of Government are called states) using UN & Gov-
ernment Protection Committees. The operational level engages 
UNMIS, UN agencies, NGOs and state and county-level government 
line ministries using Protection Working Groups. The grass-root level 
engages UN and INGO actors that target community representatives 
in high-risk areas to build awareness of basic rights through Commu-
nity-based Protection Networks. Whilst the stakeholders and mecha-
nisms are identified, the activities related to these levels are not as 
well developed in the strategy. The strategy argues that because 
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UNMIS is an integrated mission the implementation of the strategy is 
a combined responsibility of UNMIS and the United Nations Country 
Team (UNCT). The strategy highlights some of the key enablers that 
need to be in place, such as strong coordination mechanisms, and the 
ability to identify, analyse and share information that can result in 
joint planning and proactive engagement with the Government of  
Sudan at all levels of engagement. UNMIS was the only mission with 
a dedicated PoC section, and the strategy provides a useful overview 
of the potential role of such a section. The separate Security Concept 
also contains useful guidance on the operationalization of the security 
component, including sections dealing with potential threats and ag-
gressors, thresholds and consequences and a four phased security con-
cept (1-Assurance, 2-Pre-emption, 3-Intervention and 4-Consolida-
tion). 
 
The most prominent change in the operationalization of the new 
UNMIS PoC strategy is the disbandment of the Protection of Civilians 
Section and the mainstreaming of PoC across large parts of the mis-
sion entities5 in consultation and coordination with the UNCT. This 
mainstreaming also implies decentralization in the sense that State and 
Sector Coordinators take on a more prominent place in the implemen-
tation of PoC. Above them, there will be PoC focal points at the re-
gional and mission level. Due to the constraints on use of force against 
the CPA parties, the strategy focuses on advance identification of vul-
nerable communities and individuals at risk of conflict or at risk of not 
benefitting from the protection of the State as well as political en-
gagement at all levels. Direct intervention is viewed as being undesir-
able. Nevertheless, the strategy envisions the establishment of three 
complementary and ‘mutually reinforcing’ lines of operations, con-
sistent with the DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on PoC: Protection 
through political prevention,6 protection from physical violence and 
establishment of a protective environment. These lines of operation 
combine preventive, remedial and environment-building activities 
destined to achieve ‘maximum efficiency and impact in the short and 
medium – long term.’ However, like its precursor, the renewed strate-
gy is open-ended in terms of concrete activities at the three lines of 
operations.7 
 
All three strategies address aspects of operationalization, but there is a 
lack of clear direction as to how the goals and objectives can be trans-
                                                 
5  These include military, police, Human Rights, Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Rule of 
Law, DDR, Child Protection and Public Information 
6  The operational concept wording is ‘Protection through political process’, which does 
have a slightly different meaning.  
7  This, however, should be seen in relation to the recent policy developments on PoC train-
ing, tasks and requirements, which could be seen as resource and referral documents for 
the strategy. However, these documents are scarcely mentioned and seldom referred to. 
For an overview of developments on PoC training, see: Gustavo de Carvalho and Andreas 
Stensland, Training to Protect Civilians: Recent Developments and Recommendations, 
Accord Policy & Practice Brief, Durban: ACCORD 2011. 
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formed into measurable results. The system-wide strategy for the DRC 
makes a good attempt at formulating measurable results, but more de-
tailed benchmarks would be necessary to meaningfully monitor im-
pact. The UNAMID Directive is very clear about how the different 
components should react to possible scenarios, and the UNMIS Strat-
egy addresses the mechanisms that need to be established, at each lev-
el, to ensure that predictable coordination structures have been estab-
lished to ensure a holistic protection system. 
Prioritization 
The UN System-wide Strategy for the Protection of Civilians in the 
DRC is based on the mandate derived from UN Security Council Res-
olution 1856 that defines Protection of Civilians, and in particular the 
protection of women, children and IDPs, as the highest priority for 
MONUC. However, the strategy takes into account the need to recon-
cile and integrate MONUC's responsibility to protect civilians with its 
mandate to support the operations of the Forces Armées de la Répu-
blique Démocratique de la Congo (FARDC) integrated brigades. 
Whilst the Security Council has explicitly prioritized the protection of 
civilian populations, the successful operations of the FARDC against 
armed movements operating in the DRC remains a priority for the na-
tional Government, and thus the forceful disarmament of the Forces 
Démocratique de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) has become a pre-
requisite for sustained protection in the Eastern DRC for the national 
Government. As the strategy is aimed at supporting the Government 
of the DRC, and as it cannot be successfully achieved without the 
support of the Government of the DRC, at times a discrepancy be-
tween the prioritization of the Security Council and of the Govern-
ment of the DRC has emerged. 
 
According to the UNAMID Directive, protection is one of four major 
priorities. However, the Directive does not give further information as 
to the hierarchy of objectives and the relation between them. Based on 
the importance that protection holds for the mission it is assumed that 
these four major priorities enjoy equal status, and that protection is 
thus one of the top priorities of UNAMID. Based on the information 
in the Directive and the Strategy, it would appear as if protection is 
indeed mainstreamed as one of the core principles, objectives and acti-
vities of the mission. 
 
The UNMIS Protection of Civilians Strategy recognizes that the pri-
mary responsibility for protection lies with the Sudanese authorities. 
UNMIS has a mandate from the UN Security Council to support the 
Government of National Unit and the Government of South Sudan 
with the implementation of the CPA. However, it also has the respon-
sibility to take direct action when necessary, utilising forceful means 
if required, to protect civilians under imminent threat. It would appear 
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as if UNMIS regards the implementation of the peace agreement be-
tween North and South Sudan as its overriding mandate, and protec-
tion as an important, but secondary priority. For example, the UNMIS 
PoC Security Concept asserts that: ‘the threshold for deciding on 
UNMIS’ armed intervention will increase in view of the expected se-
riousness of consequences for UNMIS’ overall mandate’. The Securi-
ty Concept frames the use of force to protect civilians as an extraordi-
nary act of last resort, and one that requires such ‘utmost caution’ that 
it could have potentially dissuaded initiative on the part of the tactical 
level commanders. In the new UNMIS strategy, the mission’s hesitan-
cy to act against the CPA parties is more clearly formulated. The 
strategy explicitly states that UNMIS ‘does not have the capabilities to 
use force against the lawfully constituted Sudanese authorities’ (i.e. 
the GoS and GoSS) to stop them from using violence against civil-
ians.’ 
 
All three mission strategies place a high priority on protection, and all 
three recognize that national authorities retain the primary responsibil-
ity for protection. However, all three also have a direct protection 
mandate. This dual role of supporting the local authorities and poten-
tially acting directly, if warranted, is very complex to manage and 
none of the strategies give enough attention to how these, at times 
conflicting, roles can be managed. All three strategies mention, some 
more explicitly than others, that in some cases agents of local authori-
ties may also be placing civilians at risk, and the mandate may thus 
result in the mission having to act, potentially with force, against the 
very local counterparts that the mission is also meant to support. It is 
not inconceivable that these missions may have to choose, at times, 
between maintaining consent and thus being able to continue to invest 
in building an environment conducive to protection, and acting force-
fully in specific cases. The UNMIS Security Concept and its new 
strategy seems to be the most cautious when it comes to the potential 
use of force, whereas the UNAMID Directive, recognising that no 
credible peace process is in place, seems the most willing to act deci-
sively, including with the use of force, to deter or respond to threats to 
the civilian population. All three strategies, and the guidance note, 
could be more upfront about how to manage this most delicate aspect 
of the protection mandate. The latest UNMIS strategy ‘solves’ this 
problem by, in practice, ruling out the possibility of using force 
against the parties to the peace agreement, and in so doing, places the 
primary responsibility for protection on its preventive and environ-
ment-building activities. 
Capabilities and Constraints 
The UN System-wide Strategy for the Protection of Civilians in the 
DRC contains a clear appraisal of the implications for the strategy on 
the limited resources at the disposal of the UN mission, the UN agen-
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cies and the local and national authorities in the DRC. The strategy 
argues that effective protection must combine humanitarian, human 
rights, political and military protection strategies. The strategy recog-
nizes that MONUC does not have the operational capacity to cover all 
potential risk areas. Instead, it has to rely on its ability to intervene 
decisively through a balance of concentration of forces in high risk 
areas and strategic and tactical reserves, to be deployed when re-
quired. The strategy emphasizes MONUC’s ability to identify patterns 
of abuse and high risk areas to better anticipate and plan for protection 
risks. 
 
The UNAMID Directive states that high levels of uncertainty and in-
security persist in areas of Darfur, and that UNAMID is obliged to 
‘restrict interventions to areas accessible in terms of safety and securi-
ty’. The strategy recognizes that around four of the eight million in-
habitants in Darfur are unreachable by UNAMID forces and partners. 
UNAMID focuses on ‘protection by presence’ in key areas where they 
have access, seeking regular contact with the maximum number of 
persons. Moreover, the strategy lists several climatic and geographical 
constrains. It also states that it will not initiate action beyond its man-
date or operational capacity. The boundaries of these are however not 
further elaborated upon. 
 
The UNMIS Protection of Civilians Strategy mentions several com-
plicating factors in Sudan’s operational environment, but fails to go 
into more detail or to suggest how these can be managed, other than 
through increased coordination and exchange of information with 
partners. The strategy could be more explicit on the limits of the mis-
sions’ ability to project force as well as the many caveats of troop con-
tributing countries. The strategy could also address how it is con-
strained by the limitations placed on it by the Government of National 
Unity, and the lack of capacity of both the Government of National 
Unity and the Government of South Sudan to prioritize protection. 
 
The most recent UNMIS PoC strategy improves upon this by taking 
into consideration the challenges and constraints on the mission in two 
ways. Firstly, through explicit presentation of the protection risks, 
threats and vulnerabilities with reference to the specific challenges in 
Sudan as the CPA comes to an end. Particularly vulnerable groups, 
such as Southerners living in the North, Northerners in the South, and 
populations living in border areas are mentioned. Secondly, the strate-
gy refers to the standard caveats ‘within capabilities’ and without 
prejudice to the host government. However, it does not explicitly men-
tion how the challenges rising from these latter constraints might be 
met. 
 
In order to develop a protection strategy, awareness of capabilities as 
well as the constraints that can enable or hinder the achievement of 
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key objectives is important. All three strategies mention various con-
straints, and the system-wide strategy of the UN in the DRC is the 
most advanced in terms of how the strategy has been specifically de-
signed to overcome these. The recognition of the importance of infor-
mation gathering, analysis and sharing with a view to inform protec-
tion planning aimed at prevention and pre-emption, as well as the con-
centration of limited capabilities in specific high risk areas, could be 
of interest to other missions in future. Although the UNAMID and 
UNMIS strategies also recognise the importance of information and 
coordination, they do not seem to have internalized it into the opera-
tionalization of the strategy to the same degree as MONUC. The stabi-
lization strategy in the Eastern DRC is also an interesting example of 
how it is possible to invest in building an environment conducive to 
protection whilst still in a stabilization phase. 
Integration and Coordination 
The UN System-wide Strategy for the Protection of Civilians in the 
DRC is a product of the close cooperation established between the UN 
peacekeeping mission and the Protection Cluster (the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights - OHCHR, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees - UNHCR, and the United Nations 
Children’s Fund - UNICEF, among others) of the UNCT in the DRC. 
MONUC is an integrated mission and the leadership of the Deputy 
Special Representative Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordina-
tor (DSRSG RC/HC) in promoting protection as a theme of common 
interest to MONUC and the UNCT was critical in securing and main-
taining the close cooperation of all stakeholders in the UN System in 
the DRC. The strategy recognizes that for protection to be effective it 
must combine humanitarian, human rights, political and military pro-
tection strategies. The protection strategy in the DRC is also linked-up 
with, and refers back to, a number of related strategies and plans. For 
instance, the third pillar of the strategy is directly linked with the State 
Authority components of the UN Stabilization Strategy for Eastern 
DRC (UNSSSS) and the Government of the DRC’s Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Plan for Areas Emerging from Armed Conflict 
(STAREC). The strategy is also interlinked with the UN Comprehen-
sive Strategy for Combating Sexual Violence in the DRC, and it is a 
building block of the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) for the 
DRC and MONUC’s Mission Implementation Plan (MIP). As such, 
the monitoring and evaluation framework of the strategy is also inte-
grated with those of the other plans and strategies mentioned. 
 
The UNAMID Directive and Strategy mention several coordination 
mechanisms and refer to the participation of several UNAMID com-
ponents and units in various internal and external coordination forums, 
including with the Government of Sudan and local authorities and 
communities. They also recognize the inter-linkages between the Di-
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rective, the Strategy and the missions’ MIP and ISF, and it would thus 
appear as if the Directive and Strategy are based on, and coherent 
with, multiple coordination frameworks. The only concern is that both 
the Directive and the Strategy appear to be drafted by the HRDU and 
at times it reads as if it speaks to other components and units from the 
perspective of the HRDU only. In those instances it does not read like 
an integrated strategy or directive developed together with and co-
owned by all the mission components. 
 
The fact that there were two UNMIS Protection of Civilians Strategy 
documents, the so-called mission-wide Strategy and a separate Securi-
ty Concept, raises concerns as to the degree to which especially the 
security and humanitarian aspects of the strategies were integrated. 
Although neither of the two documents addresses this per se, it is 
known that in practice the Protection Working Groups function as 
UNCT humanitarian clusters and do not include the security compo-
nents of the mission. The result is that another level of information 
management and coordination is necessary to ensure that there is an 
adequate flow of information between the humanitarian actors on the 
one side, and the security actors on the other, and it is not clear to 
what extent there are any such mechanisms dedicated to the protection 
of civilians. It is also of concern that the security-focused aspect of 
protection, that is obviously a critically important part of the mission-
wide strategy, is not summarised or otherwise integrated in the mis-
sion-wide strategy. Instead it is mentioned as being contained in the 
Directive of the Special representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG) of 4 August 2009. The strategy makes provision for a number 
of coordination mechanisms at state and county levels, but does not 
address how this strategy will be managed within the mission, especi-
ally at the Mission headquarters in Khartoum and in Juba. As a result, 
it is likely that the military component would manage and monitor the 
security component of the strategy separately from the Office of the 
DSRSG RC/HC that may take responsibility for the humanitarian ac-
cess portions of the strategy. It is unclear if the DSRSG political is 
responsible for the longer-term political, judicial and environment-
building aspects. However, as the protection section, that should prob-
ably have a central role in environment building, falls under the 
DSRSG RC/HC, it seems likely that this aspect is also managed under 
a humanitarian umbrella. The lack of an integrated mission implemen-
tation framework under the leadership of the SRSG, that bring the 
humanitarian and military dimension together, may result in the hu-
manitarian and security dimensions operating in silos, especially at the 
mission HQ level. The fact that there are two, separate strategy docu-
ments seem to indicate that this is, in fact, the case. 
 
In the new UNMIS strategy, this dual approach to protection contin-
ues on paper – with the Security Concept as a separate document alto-
gether. Organizationally, however, the strategy seeks to implement 
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PoC as a cross-cutting UNMIS-responsibility that requires coordina-
tion mechanisms between all three sectors, civilian, police and mili-
tary. It envisions a system for monitoring and analysis and reporting 
of protection-related information at state and regional levels to gener-
ate rapid reactions. The strategy moves forward in specifying how co-
ordination mechanisms at state and county level will be managed 
within the mission. All PoC related planning activities, whether civil-
ian or military led, at HQ, regional, sector or State levels addressing 
strategic, operational and tactical planning aspects, will have to sys-
tematically be based on ‘close consultation between military, mission 
support and PoC civilian focal points’. PoC civilian focal points, mili-
tary planners and Director of Mission Support (DMS) staff will be 
designated permanently to participate both on a routine and emergen-
cy basis in joint planning efforts, at state, sector, regional and head-
quarters levels. 
 
The strategy describes the creation of several levels of coordination 
mechanisms, from military coordination between UNMIS and the  
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), to UN coordination at state 
and sector levels, as well as at the regional and the national level. The 
strategy has detailed provisions for the participants, structure, roles 
and responsibilities of the various coordination mechanisms. For the 
purpose of PoC activities mainstreaming, coordination and operational 
implementation, each state and sector coordinator will create a Protec-
tion Task Force, bringing together UNMIS civilian sections, UN Po-
lice (UNPOL) and the military. These task forces will produce a joint 
consolidated mapping of protection needs in each state that will be 
updated monthly. Likewise, State and sector coordinators will estab-
lish Stand-by State Protection Teams, to enable investigations, verifi-
cation of reports on gross abuses, rapid reaction to emergencies and 
conflict mitigation and resolution initiatives. These teams will also 
conduct field missions. 
 
State and sector coordinators will take a prominent role in the imple-
mentation of the new PoC strategy. They will ensure that protection 
become a key focus of their activities and of their engagement with 
Sudanese state officials. Protection focal points will be designated 
amongst staff with specific protection expertise at regional headquar-
ters levels. They will develop a training curriculum for the mission 
and will be tasked with sustaining the training of civilians, UN police 
and military personnel on protection issues, concepts and processes to 
support the implementation of the strategy. Considering the short 
timeframe from the drafting of the strategy to the end-date of the mis-
sion (8 months), this is quite an ambitious objective. 
 
All three mission strategies make reference to how they are intercon-
nected to other related policy, strategy and planning frameworks, and 
there thus seem to be a solid understanding of the need for policy co-
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herence in these missions. However, in practise, the management 
structures of the security-protection dimension and the humanitarian 
access dimension does not always seem to be as integrated as it should 
be. In all three cases the strategy documents could give the SRSG a 
more direct role in overseeing the implementation and monitoring the 
progress of the implementation of the protection of civilian strategies. 
Conclusion 
The most serious tensions that emerge from a comparison of these 
three strategies are those between the missions and the local authori-
ties on the one hand, and those between the security and humanitarian 
dimensions of the missions on the other. The tensions between the 
missions and their local counterparts are caused by two factors. First, 
the missions are, on the one hand consent based and mandated to sup-
port the local authorities, and on the other they have the mandate to 
use force, including potentially against their local counterparts, alt-
hough this is specifically excluded as an option in the latest UNMIS 
strategy. This tension is not resolvable but can potentially be managed 
politically through clear and ongoing communication channels with 
local authorities so that they are aware of the mission’s mandate, ap-
proach and policies. 
 
The tension between the security and humanitarian dimensions are 
also deeply rooted, but past experience has shown that this tension can 
be managed through ongoing coordination, joint training, joint plan-
ning and joint monitoring and evaluation. The aim is not so much to 
arrive at a common approach, as it is to bring both sides to a point 
where they respect the role and contribution of the other and therefore 
recognize the need to coexist and coordinate. Future mission strategies 
should not shy away from these core tensions, but be explicit about 
the efforts they will apply to address and manage these tensions. 
Mechanisms need to be in place where potential differences can be 
exchanged, and a culture of frank and open dialogue needs to be de-
veloped, based on mutual recognition and respect. 
 
All three mission strategies have shown a lack of appreciation for the 
social capital of host communities to manage their own protection. 
Most local societies will have developed coping strategies for protec-
tion before the deployment of the mission, and will continue to apply 
such approaches after the mission has withdrawn. The PoC strategies 
of the missions should be more sensitive to how they can support local 
protection capacities, as opposed to imposing their own ideas and ap-
proaches on the host communities. The strategies should also be more 
sensitive to the unintended consequences of mission actions, and be 
more proactive in monitoring the impact they are having, including 
potential side effects. 
 
Strategies for the Protection of Civilians: A Comparison of MONUC, UNAMID and UNMIS 17 
There is little focus on how to assess the populations own perception 
of threats and protection needs. The system-wide strategy of the UN in 
the DRC probably goes furthest in its focus on needs-based responses 
where and when appropriate, rather than a focus on mission activities 
and sequencing. 
 
Lastly, the three strategies reflect varying degrees of an integrated ap-
proach. The system-wide strategy of the UN in the DRC seems to be 
the most integrated of the three. It appears to have achieved a security-
humanitarian nexus with a cooperative approach to protection – with-
out threatening the independence of the humanitarian actors. The 
UNAMID Directive and Strategy also reflects a thorough, multidi-
mensional approach, but the strong drafting role of the HRDU is of 
concern, and it would have been more encouraging if the Directive 
and Strategy were more reflective of a common effort. UNMIS, with 
its two separate strategy documents, one reflecting the security  
approach and the other a more broad political and humanitarian ap-
proach, was probably the least integrated of the three strategies, but 
the new strategy provides for cross-cutting mission-wide responsibil-
ity, and it established coordination and monitoring mechanisms that 
encourage integration among the various mission components. 
Whether this has actually resulted in improved integration is not yet 
known. 
 
This comparison reveals interesting differences and similarities among 
the three missions. It indicates how generic guidance needs to be ap-
plied differently in specific contexts, and how the time-period, or 
phase, the mission finds itself in, needs to be taken into consideration. 
 
